

Stories of Autonomy:

A Critical Introduction in Defense of a Belief
in the Indifference of the Will

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1. Introduction

This work offers a resolution to the long-disputed debates about the liberty of the *will* and *necessity* by referencing the will's immediate experience of its *indifference*, or better known as the will's *autonomy*. I have placed David Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature* at the centre of this discussion as I believe Hume's general philosophical project in treatise can open to us new ways of thinking about the liberty of the will, while a study of his explicit dogma against *religion* can establish the pretext necessary for critically evaluating the literature of the *metaphysics of free-will*.

This essay is concerned with two general tasks. As for the first task, I provide a critical catalog of the philosophical debate of free-will approached through Hume's overarching philosophical system. Traditionally, in the western philosophical discourse two competing positions have formed campaigns on the different fronts of the debate of liberty: *compatibilism*, and *incompatibilism*. In short and as suggested with the titles, the former position's proponents insist liberty and necessity are compatible, and the latter position's proponents maintain liberty and necessity are not compatible. As I argue in the course of this work, I believe a *proper* conception of liberty, concerned with the *activity* of the will is not compatible with necessity. On the other hand, I believe the *philosophical* capacity of *substance monist* incompatibilism runs out after showing the incompatibility between liberty and necessity as it fails to secure a positive account of liberty of the will and its *self-causal* quality.

As for the second task, this paper argues in favor of a *belief* in *liberty of indifference* by the way of an appeal to the description of some of the most foundational psychological facts of human life. I argue that the belief in the liberty of indifference is foundational to the convention of being the protagonist of one's story of autonomy, this convention is an indispensable psychological fact of a meaningful human life, and that any reasonable person can see that the commitment to a meaningful human life takes precedence over the commitment to shaky metaphysical debates. My work offers a resolution to the debate of liberty by changing the maxim of the question in the debate in the same manner that Hume has already done so: *we may ask what induces us to believe the indifferent existence of the will?* but it is in vain to ask *Whether the will is indifferent or not?*

2. On the Foundations of the Debate

Hume offers two avenues of defense for the compatibilist position. His argument in favor of compatibilism is two-fold: it consists of a philosophical defense of the compatibility of necessity and the *liberty of spontaneity*, and it also offers a description of psychological facts of *moral sentiments* in favor of the philosophical position. This unique complexity of his discussion enables me to take his philosophy as a statement for compatibilism as a general philosophical position, and deal with different compatibilist philosophers under Hume's overarching narrative. Before doing that, however, it is necessary to understand what the will is and what necessity is.

a. The Will

Hume identifies the will as an *internal impression* of the mind (THN, 2.3.1.2). The will, under this account, is not properly understood a faculty of the mind, but merely a conscious feeling that one experiences in conjunction with motion in their bodies and emergence of new perceptions in their minds. It is important to note that considering the will as an impression paves the way for Hume and the compatibilist in general to situate the will within general causal relations. Impressions are effects of things on the mind. If the will is an impression, like all other impressions it is an effect of things on the

mind and therefore cannot be indifferent or uncaused. On the other hand, if the compatibilist does not consider the will as an impression of the mind, it would be hard for them to identify in what way the will is *caused*, and if the will is uncaused, the whole compatibilist position comes under immediate treat.

This work's contribution could be understood as a challenge to the above-mentioned naturalistic conception of the will. I believe it does not matter if the will is ultimately a *node* caught in graphs of causal relations. Empirically, as human beings of this historic era, we are yet to describe precisely even the behaviour of simplest of biological structures such as viruses to overcome the treat of HIV. Empirical data, that which we get from the sciences, have not yet provided an exhaustive account of how the will (that which ironically is the perceiver of those exact sciences) is a passive impression. As I argue, a conception of the will as an internal impression first has costly philosophical consequences which are usually pushed into forgetfulness, and on the other hand this conception fundamentally undermines the psychological ability of the will to maintain a healthy relationship with its environment. The will can locally enter debates in regard to its indifference and playfully negate itself, but the will's psychological conception of itself as indifferent is indispensable to it in global socio-political life.

b. Necessity

Hume's compatibilist position could be properly interpreted only with the consideration of his unique account of causal necessity. When we say A causes B, we do not mean that there is a necessary connection between A and B. Unlike logical necessity under which the truth of a proposition is contained in and forced by the truth of a prior proposition, when speaking of causal necessity, we do not mean that the existence of causes *compels* the existence of effects (2.3.1.4)¹. We only perceive the constant union of certain objects with certain other objects and from the existence of one and by a *determination* of the mind we infer causal relations between one group of objects and another group of objects (2.3.2.4). This way of conceiving causal relations enables Hume and the compatibilist in general to make the crucial compatibilist distinction between an action caused and an action *compelled*. Farther, by this account of causation the compatibilist gains grounds and argue that since the inference from actions to motives is required for holding any agent morally responsible, necessity is a requirement of moral responsibility (2.3.1.14).

I must confess that similar to Strawson, I feel most comfortable with acknowledging my membership to the party of philosophers who do not know what necessity is (Strawson, 1). That being said, I believe Hume's account of necessity could provide the compatibilist what is necessary to argue actions that are *caused* are not actions that are *compelled*. The distinction is vital for what the compatibilist usually value the most in this debate, the *moral responsibility* of agents. I do not know how exactly the fantasy of *order* without *imposition* works out, but I also believe going forward with Hume's conception of causal necessity could provide the better common ground with the compatibilist in favor of a critical dialogue.

3. Philosophical Arguments for Compatibilism

One way the compatibilist defends their position is through making a distinction between two kinds of liberties and then arguing one is confused and that the other conception of liberty, the *proper* conception of liberty is surly compatible with necessity. As identified by Hume, there are two competing

¹ This interpretation of Hume's account of causation is inspired by A. J. Ayer's "Freedom and Necessity". Look at the works cited page.

conceptions of liberty: *liberty of indifference*, and *liberty of spontaneity*. The doctrine of the liberty of indifference suggests that the will is causally autonomous and indifferent to natural causes. The compatibilist usually interprets this position as negation of causation, renders it unintelligible and equates the doctrine of indifference with *chance* (THN, 2.3.1.18). The incompatibilist, on the other hand insists that the liberty of indifference is the ability of the will to exist in a self-causal manner. For this, they must either reject necessity or suggest some form of *dualism*. Rejecting necessity has far reaching consequences for natural sciences without any compensations for what matters in moral responsibility. The other option is also a very hard pill to swallow in our *market driven* days of *scientific triumph*.

After rejecting the indifference of the will, the compatibilist suggests that it is the *spontaneity* of the will that makes its actions worthy of moral evaluation. They insist to act freely is nothing but to be able to act in accordance to the volitions of the will and that in itself is compatible with necessity. They argue necessity is even a requirement of moral responsibility as morally worthy action is that which is caused by the will and is free from external violence. In five subsections I provide Hume's refutation of the liberty of indifference, present Hobbes' description of the liberty of spontaneity, discuss the alternative possibilities of action and Frankfurt's cases, review Ayer's oscillating views on the debate of free-will, and I finally finish the section by some critical remarks on the foundational philosophical shortcomings of compatibilism.

a. Hume's Refutation of the Will's Indifference

Hume suggests the conception of liberty that considers the will to be uncaused and indifferent to all causal relations is confused. Stripped of its dignity, in the Treatise the liberty of indifference gets equated with chance (2.3.1.18). Chance consists in negation of causation, but the moralist does not get what they want with asserting the absence of all causes behind the actions. The moralist needs *moral evidence*, an inference of the motives from the actions, to hold anyone accountable and moral evidence depends on necessity (2.3.1.15). A person can be judged by their action if their motives could be inferred by a judgment of their character. Against the doctrine of indifference, Hume argues what makes agents morally responsible is not the absence of necessity, but the presence of a certain type of causes. Mad-men are not held responsible because they do not cause their action (2.3.1.13). Rational agents are morally responsible exactly because their action informs us of their motives and characters as the causes of those action. The fault of the moralist in requiring the indifference of the will, Hume suggests is in them mixing up causations with compulsion and violence (2.3.2.1).

In refutation of will's indifference, the compatibilist points out that liberty is not the absences of causes, but the presence and prevalence of a certain *type* of causes in the behaviour: the internal causes. One must ask in what sense a type of causes are different than another type of causes. The natural causes behind the movement of the most minute particles of this world appear to be of the same type as the causes behind the movement of celestial bodies. For agents to be morally responsible, the causes of their action must be *internal*. This internal/external distinction is a necessary requirement for the compatibilist to able to hold agents morally responsible and as I argue toward the end of this section, begs the indifference of the will.

b. Hobbes on the Liberty of Spontaneity

In chapter XXI: Of the Liberty of Subject in the *Leviathan*, Hobbes writes: "Liberty, or Freedom, signifies (properly) the absence of Opposition" (Hobbes, 136). Hobbes continues "by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion". Freedom, then, appears to be an attribute of acts rather than agents.

The movement of a ball is free if it is not hindered by another external impediment, and an action of a person is free if the action is not coerced by an external force. The freedom of a person, then, consists in their ability to do what they have a will to do (136).

Intuitively, an agent could be held morally responsible, only if in making moral decisions they can do *otherwise*. The compatibilist tries to satisfy this criterion through a conditional analysis of the alternative possibilities of action. They would say it does not matter if it had become necessary for the agent to act a certain way, what matters is that they wanted to do that thing and were successful in doing it; had it been the case that they did not want to do it, they were free not to do it. The compatibilist would say necessity and responsibility are compatible since at the time of a free action and in the absence of the external impediments, the agent could have done otherwise if they wanted to; it just had been the case that they did not.

There are minor problems with this case such as the case of a mad person with involuntary desires. This line of objection would undermine the reliability of the analysis due to over inclusion. For example, I might hallucinate and that would lead me into wanting strange things. We usually do not consider a person acting under these conditions as acting in accordance with free-will and moral responsibility.

The fundamental issue with this account is however the pre-necessitation of the will's desires and inclination. Imagine if due to some strange mental condition and unconsciously I am terrified of the color green and without knowing about my condition I am incapable of desiring anything green. I go to the ice cream store and between vanilla ice cream and lime sorbet I wish to have vanilla ice cream and get it. In this case my choice of vanilla ice cream has not been free since even though there did not exist any kind of external impediments, I was simply incapable of choosing another option.

Put in broader terms the conditional analysis of the liberty of spontaneity appears to fail to account for a reasonable possibility of the alternatives of action. If necessity is true, then all my desires and wishes are also pre-necessitated. Therefore, "I could have acted differently if I had wanted to" is simply meaningless and an empty proposition, since there had been no possibility for me to want, or desire differently according to the actual circumstances.

c. The Liberty to do Otherwise and Frankfurt's Compatibilism

Is the possibility of the alternatives of action a necessary condition for moral responsibility? Harry Frankfurt claims it is not. Frankfurt, in *Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility*, suggests that there are cases where the agent does not have the liberty to act otherwise, but they are nonetheless considered morally responsible (Frankfurt, 835). I argue the Frankfurt's category of examples does not work out as he was intended. Moral agents are responsible in these cases exactly because the possibility of the alternatives of action are somewhere discreetly presupposed in these scenarios.

Frankfurt discusses cases in which potential coercive forces are present to ensure an agent behaves in certain ways without any alternatives of action and we still consider the agents morally responsible (835). Suppose some kind of agency is willing to do whatever it takes to coerce me to act a certain way. Not knowing anything about their intentions, nor their readiness for forceful intervention, I, on my own, decide to act in their favor. I am morally responsible for what I do even though I do not have the liberty to do otherwise than I do. Frankfurt concludes that since the mere fact that I had not been

able to do otherwise does not undermine my moral responsibility, necessity and responsibility are compatible.

I think Frankfurt's category of example and analysis only postpones the issue of the liberty of the responsible agent to do otherwise. I agree with Frankfurt that we surly do and should hold me responsible for my action in such a scenario, but we do so because we believe I was able to do something alternatively in a tract of time. I am responsible regardless of the intentions of the forceful agency, but I am responsible exactly because it is presumed that I was able to *will* otherwise than I did. Even Frankfurt himself formulates his categorical examples in the language of the Alternative Possibilities: the coercive force waits until the agent "make up his mind what to do." (836). All I can say is that the figure of a self-caused will is still fully present and visible in Frankfurt's analysis despite all his effort to strategically camouflage it.

d. Ayer's Compatibilism and Ayer's Reluctant Confession

In *Freedom and Necessity*, Ayer establishes that moral responsibility requires the liberty to act otherwise. He makes the observation that when it is said that someone is morally responsible, it is implied that they could have acted otherwise, and it is only *believed* that a person is morally responsible when it is believed that they could have acted otherwise than they did. As he puts it, "a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid" (Ayer, *Philosophical Essays* 271).

Like Hume, Ayer argues if we think about necessity and liberty properly, we can see that they are compatible. We only think the two are incompatible because we are confused about causation. If we come to see causation is nothing but the constant union of alike event, we can see neither force nor compulsion are associated with causal necessity (257).

Ayer argues a person is morally responsible for an act, let us say stealing, only if the person could have acted otherwise, and he could have acted otherwise if he had met these three criteria:

1. They could have acted otherwise if they had wished so
2. That their action was voluntary in the sense in which the actions of a kleptomaniac are not
3. Nobody had compelled them to act as they did. (257)

He then suggests all these three conditions are compatible with necessity.

I believe Ayer overlooks the requirements behind the *second* condition. What exactly does this different *sense* mean? What quality distinguishes a sense of causes, from another sense of causes? The very problem with necessity is that if it is true, the causes behind the actions of the kleptomaniac and the supposedly morally responsible agent are of the same type and sense.

Interestingly enough, Ayer reluctantly backs down from his position in his later works. In *Metaphysics and Common-Sense* he acknowledges that the idea that agents somehow stand outside the order of nature is "one that many people find attractive on emotional grounds" (Ayer, *Metaphysics and Common-Sense* 221). He writes:

Since it is not at all clear why one's responsibility for an action should depend on its being causally inexplicable, this may only prove that most people are irrational, but

there it is. I am, indeed, strongly inclined to think that our ordinary ideas of freedom and responsibility are very muddleheaded: but for what they are worth, they are also very firmly held. It would not be at all easy to estimate the social consequences of discarding them (239).

Ayer Clearly understands there is something deeply worrying about compatibilism. He nullifies the worry by saying, most probably, most people are simply irrational. I think Ayer dangerously downplays the role of the will's belief in its indifference. A belief in the liberty of indifference is not simply *an* emotional attachment. Such belief of the will is the psychological requirement of rendering emotions intelligible. What Ayer snobbishly disregards as the *convention of the masses* is indispensable to the will. I think Hume's philosophical system can help us better understand the necessity of such convention and establish a philosophical relationship with it. As I have mentioned before, we can provide a resolution to this debate by changing the maxim of the question and since it is in vain to ask if the will is indifferent or not, we can start asking what induces us to believe in the will's indifference. Before that, and in the next sub-section, I provide some philosophical objections to the compatibilist position.

e. Philosophical Limitations of the Compatibilist Position

I have already discussed the problem with necessity and alternatives of action. It appears that being able to act otherwise is a requirement for moral responsibility. It also appears that different logical accounts of compatibilism fail to provide a satisfactory account of moral agents presumed ability to do and will otherwise than they do.

On the other hand, Hume's account of causation (which as discussed before is most favorable by the compatibilist position) leaves the compatibilist with an important vulnerability. The moralist needs to establish an *intentional link* between the agent and their action in order to account for the agent's moral responsibility. As a matter of moral fact, morally worthy action is *forced* by and is contained in the will. Such account of *activity* is simply non-existence in the *reactive* world of the compatibilist and in Hume's passive account of causation. If necessity is the constant union of alike objects with an inference of the mind, the actions are not in any morally intelligible way necessitated by motives and character.

Furthermore, and as I have hinted before, there is something philosophically costly about conceiving the will as a mere effect of natural causes. I have already discussed that the compatibilist, one way or another, identifies the will as an *internal impression*. It is now time to go back to the very first page of the Treatise, where Hume distinguishes between *ideas* and *impressions* and lightheadedly claim "I believe it will not be necessary to employ many words in explaining the distinction" (THN 1.1.1.1). Well, I beg to differ.

What differentiates between ideas and impressions is their fundamentally different relationship with the mind. The mind is passive with respect to the impressions. Impressions *force* themselves on the mind. The mind, however, is conceived *active* with respect to its ideas. Some part of the mind is supposed to be able to summon, juxtapose, and transfigure ideas. Let us call that part the will. Now, if the will conceives of itself as an internal impression, then it is conceiving itself as something passive and renders its relationship with the mind's ideas unintelligible. The difference between ideas and impressions is *psychologically clear*, *philosophically necessary*, and *ontologically* under treat by the compatibilist's conception of the will as an internal impression.

4. Psychological Evidence in Favor of Compatibilism and A Psychological Rejection of Compatibilism

Another avenue of support for compatibilism begins from the psychological description of *moral sentiments* and their role in every day inter-subjective practices. Under this strategy, the compatibilist draws the attention to what Strawson best describes as “the efficacy of the practices of punishment, and of moral condemnation and approval, in regulating behavior in socially desirable ways” (Strawson, 2). I think this strategy could ultimately lead us into a resolution since it draws the attention to the psychological requirements of socially necessary practices such as holding people responsible, or as bearer of political rights. Here I discuss Strawson’s account of *reactive attitudes*, provide a criticism of Hume’s proxy war with religion in the field of liberty and lay out the psychological limitations of the compatibilist position to pave the way for a better understanding of the will’s entitlement to a belief of its indifference discoursed in the next section.

a. Strawson’s Account of Reactive Attitudes

In his classic work *Freedom and Resentment*, Strawson distinguishes between two psychological attitudes:

- a. Objective Attitudes: Considering people as *things* to be managed, handled, and dealt with.
- b. Reactive Attitudes: “Attitudes belonging to involvement or participation with other in inter-personal human relationships”, including “resentment, gratitude, anger” (10)

Strawson identifies different kinds of reactive attitudes we hold toward the wrong doings of an agent: of a person against ourselves, of a person against another person, and of ourselves against ourselves. He then insists, and I think rightly so, that the truth of necessity does not delegitimize such attitudes. He suggests that attention to moral sentiments, the network of human reactions, could best lead us to reconcile the disputes between the incompatibilists and compatibilists (12). He argues that the idea that we are morally responsible must be understood by referencing the facts of our moral sentiments. Since moral sentiments are simply expressions of demands and concerns about treatment of one another, there is no problem of incompatibility between moral responsibility and necessity.

Strawson’s compatibilism is trivial. Strawson successfully shows that the description of a narrow sense of moral responsibility, only concerned by reactive agents is compatible with the truth of necessity. A serious compatibilist theory, however, must also attend to the problem with the activity of the will. I am ready to concede to Strawson that maybe there is nothing more to moral responsibility rather than being situated in a web of inter-personal and reactive attitudes and that this moral responsibility is compatible with necessity. This, however, does not tell us anything about the autonomy and activity of the will that carries those reactive attitudes.

There are animals which do have reactive attitudes toward one another and themselves in their communities. Kids are also capable of having reactive attitudes against other people and themselves based on some kind of identification of the will behind the action. We usually, at least in our philosophy of rights, want to distinguish between human adults and those animals or kids by sticking to the idea that adult humans are especially autonomous entities. This kind of confidence is also a part of our everyday practices that we cannot get rid of easily. We do not identify an autonomous being as a

creature which behaves purely *reactively*, but as a creature who is also capable of some form of active self-governance.

b. Hume's Proxy War with Religion

Similarly, to Strawson, Hume has also made the point that the laws of human society are *founded on rewards and punishments* and by that they regulate society in socially desirable ways (THN, 2.3.2.5). He references human psychology and correctly observes that as a matter of fact and in everyday life we do attribute necessity to the will of people (2.3.2.4). We do perceive constant union of motives and circumstances with actions and by the inference of the mind, we do anticipate people's behaviour based on their motives and circumstances. Such inference, Hume argues, is of the same nature of the inference made from the constant union of physical events and is nothing but necessity (2.3.2.4).

Hume has properly identified a psychological aspect of everyday life. But, his obsession with religion prevents him from making a *complete* survey of human psychological facts. Hume has already shown that there is no *necessary connection* between the causes and effects. But he has praised causal necessity as the *determination of the mind* (2.3.1.4). Hume has already accepted neither reason nor senses could tell us if external objects exist. But he has agreed that the faculty of *imagination* must be considered the sovereign of the debate (1.4.2.14).

Yet, when it comes to autonomy, the will is reduced to an internal impression and the psychological fact of the will's conception of its indifference is condemned as *false sensation* (2.3.2.2). Hume's proxy war with religion in the field of liberty leads him astray on his stance on the indifference of the will. He suggests *religion has been very unnecessarily interested* in the liberty of indifference (2.3.2.3). Most mediocly Hume is a man of his times when he confuses Religion with the institutions of European churches. What Hume does not mention, is that if we strip it of its transcendentality, religion is a craft, a production of *humanly* employed beliefs and practices to manifest and make intelligible *the will's subjective perception of its indifference and the perceived objective regularity of nature*.

c. The Psychological Limitations of the Philosophical Position of Compatibilism

Attention to liberty in the western philosophical discourse is usually limited to the issue of moral responsibility. Surly, as Hume and Strawson successfully prove so, an objective description of the mind's *mechanistic/utilitarian* attitudes could account for a narrow sense of moral responsibility only concerned with reactively sensitive agents and this sense of moral responsibility is compatible with necessity. Yet, another aspect of liberty is the activity of the agent and what they perceive as their power and autonomy in leading their lives *despite* necessities and through their *own* necessitation.

For me to have a passion of learning piano, it is a psychological necessity to believe it is, in the last instance, *autonomously* on my own shoulder to labor and learn to play. Granted, I cannot show *a priori* that this perceived activity and autonomy is not itself causally necessitated. That being said, I cannot simultaneously believe that the perceived activity of my will is a delusion and still be psychologically capable of having passions for learning piano, freeing myself from addiction, or revolting against the oppression of an apartheid system. Faced with this complexity that reason cannot by itself resolve, in the next section I argue the will has an entitlement to a belief of its autonomy.

5. The Will's Entitlement to a Belief in its Indifference

I have discussed the philosophical difficulties of providing an account for the compatibility of necessity and the activity of the will. I have also observed that it is psychologically necessary for the will to conceive of itself as an *active substance* and causally indifferent to be able to develop passions and labor to attend to those passions. Holding a *belief* of causal autonomy in relation to the actuality and achievability of one's objects of passions is indispensable for having those passions. To see why the will is justified in believing itself to be indifferent, it helps to look at Hume's own discussion on the role of reason and passions in directing the axis of the will.

In the Treatise, Hume argues that reason cannot motivate any action of the will and it "can never oppose passion in the direction of the will" (2.3.3.1). He argues abstract reasoning never influences any of our actions. It only directs our judgment concerning causes and effects (2.3.3.2). In a strikingly utilitarian tone, Hume insists that the aversion or propensity toward any object arises purely by an anticipation of pain or pleasure (2.3.3.3.) Reason can only tell us if our judgments are false, but it cannot cause an impulse in the will to act a certain way (2.3.3.6). Now, if we have agreed that an assumption of indifference is a psychological necessity of the will to develop passions (which are the directions of the will), then we can see that reason is not in the right place to refute the autonomy of the will because it cannot subsequently offer a direction for the will.

The metaphysical debate of the will's indifference is probably the most socially/politically relevant metaphysical issue. The passivity of philosophy and the idleness of philosophers in this debate has stark consequences for the human society. The question of necessity and liberty is mirrored in political life as a contest between the objectivity of *economy* and the communality of *democracy*. While economy engages with human beings as objects to dealt with, democracy depends on the fable of *citizenship*. The foundation of citizenship is an *oath* actively taken by the citizen to preserve certain laws, bear legal responsibilities, and enjoy rights of citizenship. The activity, self-governance, or the autonomy of the citizens is indispensable to any legitimate conception of democracy. With all that we can read and interpret through reason from history, democracy must be defended as a necessary pre-text to *just labor*, including *philosophy*.

Philosophy has been put in a strange position between a childish demonic personification of religion and the almighty explanatory power of the natural sciences. It appears that for now it has decided to recede and become an apology for the scientific conduct which is itself nothing but ultimately a production in the field of political economy. Philosophy repeatedly perceives and insists that necessity is nothing but a determination of the mind from the constant conjunction of alike object. Necessity is nothing but a presumed foundation for natural sciences. Necessity is a tool of the mind. How could it negate and harm its founder, the indifferent mind, unless the mind that has formed its ideas is either mad and decadent or is using the tools at its disposal wrongly.

6. Concluding Remarks

I have argued that reason fails to positively account for the compatibility of necessity and a proper conception of liberty which would include the activity of the will; that the will's experience of its indifference is a psychological requirement for its ability to develop passions; and finally, that reason is not in a place to undermine what is necessary for the will to develop passions for its wellbeing. That is to say, a thorough and practical account of the philosophical compatibility of liberty and necessity is not

available to the reason; since it is psychologically necessary for the will to conceive itself autonomous, it is entitled to such belief in its autonomy. I stress this does not undermine the utility of the sciences of the mind. These sciences have properly modeled local instances of the will's activity, have usefully manipulated particular social determinations, and most certainly, they have become instruments of power in the society. Surely, by induction such conduct *approximates* the exhaustion of the *totality* of the will. But then again, the oblivious philosopher at this decisive moment forgets that induction is nothing but the determination of the mind and a utility of the will. Such determination is a tool of the mind and is not in the proper place to undermine the activity of that which has assumed it for its use. *The I is entitled to a belief in its autonomy.* As promised in the introduction of this work, I hope I have been able to successfully persuade my reader that *We may ask what induces us to believe the indifferent existence of the will?*, but it is in vain to ask whether the will is indifferent or not?

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